HYRJE | HISTORI | LETĖRSI | FOTOGRAFI | LAJME | INFO | RRETH NESH |     FJALA e LIRĖ


Kontakto: [ ] ose [ Kontakti ]

 
  [ Prapa ]


E vėrteta pėr Kosovėn

-- nga Isuf B. Bajrami, Gjilan, prill 2008

Isuf B. Bajrami Vėmendja e diplomacisė botėrore gjithnjė e mė shumė po pėrqendrohet nė ēėshtjen e Kosovės. Nė duart e anėtarėve tė Kėshillit tė Sigurimit tė OKB-sė, tashmė ėshtė njė propozim i adresuar nga ish-kryetari finlandez, Martti Ahtisaari, qė i ėshtė bashkėngjitur dokumentit mė tė cilin ai ka vėnė kornizat e njė statusi tė mundshėm tė ardhshėm tė Kosovės, ka pėrmbledhur garancitė pėr pozitėn e pakicave, veēanėrisht atė serbe nė Kosovė dhe ka pėrshkruar modalitetet pėr praninė relativisht tė theksuar ndėrkombėtare nė Kosovė, me fuqi ekzekutive dhe tė interpretimit tė mandatit tė vet, edhe pas vendimit eventual pėr statusin e ri tė saj qė, edhe ashtu, pavarėsinė dhe sovranitetin eventual tė Kosovės do t’i bėnin me shume formale se sa faktike.

Tash ėshtė nė pėrgjegjėsinė e anėtarėve tė Kėshillit tė Sigurimit qė tė marrin njė vendim rreth tė ardhmes sė Kosovės. Jemi nė dijeni se Serbia ka ndėrmarrė njė ofensivė diplomatike pėr tė ndikuar te anėtarėt e Kėshillit tė Sigurimit tė OKB-sė qė tė pamundėsohet nxjerrja e njė rezolute tė re tė tij, me arsyetimin se, me propozimin e Ahtisaarit, Serbisė “po i merret njė pjesė e territorit tė shtetit” dhe se “po i hiqet sovraniteti mbi Kosovėn”dhe se e tėrė kjo, sipas zyrtarėve tė Beogradit, ”ėshtė nė kundėrshtim me ligjin ndėrkombėtar”. Kjo ėshtė arsyeja qė, me qėllim tė informimit mė tė tė plotė tė lexuesve tuaj dhe, njėkohėsisht tė anėtarėve tė Kėshillit tė Sigurimit tė OKB-sė, me njė bibliografi relativisht tė gjerė politike dhe juridike, tė theksoj, nė vija tė pėrgjithshme, njė numėr argumentesh dhe faktesh historike, politike e juridike, tė cilat, nė mėnyrėn mė bindėse, flasin se Kosova ėshtė vendosur nėn pushtimin serb, nė udhė jo legjitime dhe pse shqiptarėt, si popull shumicė nė Kosovė, duhet tė gėzojnė tė drejtėn e vetėvendosjes, qoftė si e drejtė e njė popullate nė njė territor tė individualizuar,qoftė si e drejtė kombėtare e tyre.

Nėpėrmjet tė argumentimit dhe faktimit tė kėsaj tė vėrtete, ky shkrim mėton, njėkohėsisht, tė argumentojė se janė plotėsisht tė papranueshme pėrsiatjet dhe projektet serbe pėr krijimin e dy entiteteve nė Kosovė ose pėr ndarjen e saj. Sė pari, meqė Kosova ėshtė aneksuar nga Serbia nė udhė jolegjitime, pavarėsia e Kosovės nė asnjė mėnyrė nuk ėshtė nė kundėrshtim me ligjin ndėrkombėtar. Ē’ėshtė e vėrteta, pavarėsia e Kosovės pėrpara se tė kualifikohej si “njė rast klasik i secesionit tė njė pjese tė njė shteti sovran”, siē shprehen serbėt, do tė duhej tė kundrohej, nė fakt, si njė “anulim aneksimi ilegjitim”. Nė tė vėrtetė, nė kundėrshtim me ligjin ndėrkombėtar kishte rėnė vetė Serbia, e cila me 1912 e aneksoi Kosovėn nėpėrmjet pushtimit ushtarak, pas njė agresioni tė saj nė Perandorinė Osmane,”edhe pse qysh prej kohėsh Kosova kishte identitetin e vet historik dhe etnik, tė shoqėruar me legjitimitetin e ēlirimit tė vet, qoftė nga pushtimi osman(1912), qoftė nga pushtimi fashist(1944), edhe pse kishte integritet gjeografik, demografik dhe kulturor tė saj”.

Sė kėndejmi, nė vend se tė pranojė veprimin e saj ilegal qė ka bėrė duke shkelur “me tė dyja kėmbėt” ligjin ndėrkombėtar, me aneksimin e Kosovės, Serbia tash pėrdor njė argument tė paqėndrueshėm shkencėrisht, historikisht dhe aktualisht, pėr tė “ruajtur sovranitetin mbi Kosovėn”tė cilin, si dėshmojnė faktet, e mbajti nė mėnyrė jolegjitime pėr njė periudhė shumė tė gjatė,pa pyetur asnjėherė popullin shumicė tė Kosovės dhe pa i marrė atij pėlqimin. Kosova ėshtė pushtuar gjatė luftėrave ballkanike(1912-13),”nė kundėrshtim me aspiratat e shqiptarėve qė kishin shprehur nė Lėvizjen Nacionalēlirimtare 1878-1912”. Shqiptarėt ishin kundėr pėrfshirjes sė tyre nė shtetin serb, pėrkatėsisht jugosllav.

Kėshtu, Serbia, edhe pse “mori legalitetin ndėrkombėtar” pėr pushtimin e Kosovės, nė asnjė mėnyrė nuk mundi ta arsyetojė legjitimitetin e veprimit tė saj. Pėrveē kėsaj, qėndrimet posesive serbe ndaj Kosovės qė i referohen historisė janė dyfish tė pathemelta. Sė pari,”janė tė pathemelta nė aspektin metodologjik tė cilėsimit tė karakterit kombėtar tė territorit, meqė po tė merrej historia si kriter,me gjithė realitetet nacionale-territoriale bashkėkohore, Hungaria do tė kishte tė drejtė tė vinte dorė mbi pjesėn jugosllave tė Panonisė, Bullgaria dhe Hungaria do tė rivalizonin rreth Beogradit, Greqia do tė vinte dorė mbi Stambollin, Shqipėria mbi Janinėn, Meksiko mbi Floridėn dhe Kaliforninė, Suedia mbi Norvegjinė dhe Finlandėn, Gjermania mbi pjesėt e rajoneve tė Shlezisė dhe tė Sudeteve, Danimarka mbi Shlezvikun, Iraku mbi Kuvajtin, etj.,etj”. Sė dyti,qėndrimet posesive serbe ndaj Kosovės “janė tė pabaza edhe nė aspektin e sė vėrtetės materiale, meqė Kosova, pėrkundėr pohimeve me karakter tė tillė, ”nuk ėshtė as djep i popullit serb, as djep i shtetit serb”.

Mė nė fund, ambiciet imperialiste me “tė drejta historike”nuk kanė mundur t’i mbrojnė Anglia, Franca, Spanja, Portugalia, Holanda qė, siē ėshtė e njohur, ”me shekuj kanė mbajtur vende e popuj tė shumtė”. Prandaj, ”me shkatėrrimin e perandorive koloniale,janė krijuar mbi 120 shtete tė reja”. Serbia ka qenė “nėn sundimin e Perandorisė Osmane pėr afro pesė shekuj(1389-1878)”,Spanja “kishte pushtuar tėrė Amerikėn Latine nė fillim tė shekullit XVI”.Edhe ”rusėt nuk kanė pėrmendur ndonjėherė “tė drejtat historike”mbi Ukrainėn”. Argumentet historike flasin bindshėm se “serbėt janė vendosur nė Kosovė me rastin e zgjerimit tė shtetit serb nė kėtė drejtim nga Nemanjiqėt”. Nė territorin etnik shqiptar, pėr pasojė pushtimesh, nė Mesjetė dhe nė kohėn e Perandorisė Osmane, janė vendosur pakica sllave,turke dhe rome.

Pakica sllave ėshtė shtuar ndjeshėm me “kolonizimin e dhunshėm nė mes tė dy luftėrave botėrore, megjithatė, kurrė nuk ka arritur tė jetė mbi 10% tė popullatės nė tėrėsi”. Mbi bazė tė kėtyre fakteve, konkluzioni ėshtė shumė i qartė:ishin pikėrisht agresioni, pushtimi dhe aneksimi serb i Kosovės qė shkelen ligjin ndėrkombėtar, e jo e kundėrta, qė pavarėsia e Kosovės “dhunon tė drejtėn ndėrkombėtare”. Historia “ėshtė dėshmitare pėr politikėn shkombėtarizuese”; pėr “krimet e mėdha ndaj shqiptarėve gjatė viteve 1912-1918”; pėr “planet gjenocidale serbe pėr shfarosjen e shqiptarėve”; pėr “shpėrnguljen e shqiptarėve nė Turqi” dhe pėr “shpronėsimin e fshatarėsisė dhe pėr kolonizimin serbo-malazias”e tjera.

Periudha 28 shkurt 1998 deri me 10 qershor 1999 vetėm sa “i ka tejkaluar rastet e veēanta dhe ka marrė pėrmasat mė tė pėrgjithshme tė gjenocidit tė pushtetit serb ndaj shqiptarėve”. Sė dyti,vendimi mbi tė ardhmen e Kosovės nuk mund tė injorojė pozitėn kushtetuese tė Kosovės nė ish-Jugosllavi, megjithė faktin se ajo nuk gėzonte statusin e republikės por, ē’ėshtė e vėrteta,ishte pjesė pėrbėrėse e ish-Jugosllavisė, me territor dhe kufijtė e vet,tė cilėt nuk mund tė ndryshoheshin pa pėlqimin e saj. Kosova ishte drejtpėrsėdrejti e pėrfaqėsuar nė Federatėn e ish-Jugosllavisė,po sikurse republikat e saj,e jo nėpėrmjet Serbisė, sepse ashtu do tė kishim njė situatė paradoksale “tė inkuadrimit tė Serbisė nė Serbi dhe tė tri Serbive me tri vota nė Federatė”, ndėrsa njėsitė tjera “do tė kishin nga njė votė”.

Me identitet politiko-territorial tė vetvetes, me kushtetutė tė vetėn, Kosova ishte njėsi konstitutive-federale e Federatės multinacionale tė Jugosllavisė. Mosnjohja e statusit tė republikės pėr Kosovėn nuk mund tė anashkalojė faktin e “origjinės jo sllave tė popullatės tė saj shumicė shqiptare”. Se Kosova nuk ishte pjesė e Serbisė dėshmojnė edhe kėto fakte historike dhe juridike:”Kosova nuk ishte nė pėrbėrjen e shtetit sovran dhe tė pavarur tė Serbisė me subjektivitet juridik ndėrkombėtar tė pranuar nė Kongresin e Berlinit(1878)”; ”Kosova nuk ishte nė pėrbėrjen e Serbisė nė Kuvendin e Dytė tė AVNOJ-it(1943); ”Kosova nuk ishte nė pėrbėrjen e Serbisė gjatė konstituimit tė saj si njėsi federale nė Kėshillin Antifashist tė Ēlirimit Popullor(1944); ”Kosova nuk ishte pjesė pėrbėrėse e Serbisė nė strukturėn e Asamblesė Kushtetutėdhėnse tė Jugosllavisė me rastin e shpalljes sė Republikės Federative tė Jugosllavisė(1945)”; ”Kosova nuk u inkuadrua nė Serbinė sovrane”, veēse nė pėrbėrje tė “Serbisė Federale nė kuadėr tė Jugosllavisė Federative”, gjatė pushtimit ushtarak nė Kosovė(1945.

Mė nė fund, vlen tė pėrmendet se edhe rrėnimi i autonomisė sė Kosovės me Amendamentet nė Kushtetutėn e Serbisė,akt ky qė ndodhi me 28 mars 1989, u bė nė udhė jolegjitime. Edhe po tė mos ekzistonin mangėsitė esenciale rreth deklarimit nė Kuvendin e Kosovės, mangėsi kėto qė janė dėshmuar, ”mosekzistimi i vullnetit tė lirė”,si pasojė e presioneve tė jashtėzakonshme politike, ”e bėn edhe deklarimin mbi ndėrrimin kushtetues-jokushtetues”. Sė treti, e ardhmja e Kosovės nuk mund tė kundrohet e krahasueshme me secesionizmin nė disa nga vendet e botės. Kėtė duhet ta kenė parasysh ato shtete qė ende mbahen tė rezervuara ndaj pavarėsisė sė Kosovės. Ato do tė duhej qė t’i kėrkojnė dhe t’i gjejnė “pikat e pėrbashkėta” tė Kosovės me disa vende tė botės qė janė pajtuar me heqjen e sovranitetit mbi territore tė tjera. Kėshtu, raportet ndėrmjet Serbisė dhe Kosovės janė,pėr shembull, tė krahasueshme me ato ndėrmjet Indonezisė dhe Timorit Lindor. Siē dihet, Timori Lindor ka qenė i pushtuar dhe aneksuar nga Indonezia nė vitin 1975 dhe atė “kundėr vullnetit tė Portugalisė si sovran i jashtėm”, fakt ky qė e ka bėrė aneksimin e Indonezisė tė jetė ilegal.

Me 1988, qeveria indoneziane ia njohi tė drejtėn e vetėvendosjes popullit tė Timorit Lindor. Singapori ėshtė njė shembull tjetėr qė duhet marrė parasysh. Ky vend u nda nga Malajzia me 1965. Edhe shembulli me Eritren ėshtė domethėnės pėr rastin e Kosovės. Ishte qeveria etiopiane ajo qė nė vitin 1991 i njohi tė drejtėn e vetėvendosjes Eritresė. Rasti i Kosovės ka ngjashmėri edhe me atė tė Namibisė. Ndarja nga Afrika e Jugut dhe pavarėsia e Namibisė ndodhėn mė 1991. Prandaj, pavarėsinė e Kosovės nuk duhet krahasuar me secesionizmin nė disa anė tė tjera tė botės, ku lėvizjet secesioniste “nuk janė duke vepruar nė territore tė aneksuara qė nė mėnyrė tė njėanshme(kundėr vullnetit tė popullit dhe tė sovranėve tė mėhershėm) u janė bashkuar shteteve aktualisht ekzistuese, por ato janė duke operuar nė territore qė kanė qenė pjesė e kėtyre shteteve nė kohėn kur kėto shtete kanė filluar sė ekzistuari”. Kėshtu ėshtė edhe me lėvizjet separatiste nė Transdnjestrovle (Moldavi), nė Osetinė Jugore dhe nė Abkhazi (Gjeorgji) qė nuk kanė bazė etnike ēfarė ka Kosova dhe qė nuk kanė pasur status autonom ose federal kur u shpėrbė ish-Bashkimi Sovjetik, siē ka pasur Kosova kur u shpėrbė ish-Jugosllavia.

Mė nė fund, shqiptarėt e Kosovės nuk janė tė krahasueshėm as me katalonėt, uelsianėt, baskėt, skocezėt, korsikanėt…, sepse ata nuk u pėrballėn, sikur shqiptarėt e Kosovės, me dėbim masiv, nga shtetet qė i kontrollojnė. Sė katėrti,ekzistimi i Shqipėrisė si shtet shqiptar, nuk mund tė qėndrojė si pengesė pėr statusin shtet i pavarur dhe sovran tė Kosovės, po sikurse qė, tė sjellim shembuj nga historia e krijimit tė shteteve, ”as ekzistimi i Rumanisė nuk qe pengesė pėr krijimin e shtetit tė Moldavisė ose qė ekzistimi i Francės nuk paraqiste pengesė pėr kantonet-shtete nė Zvicėr”.Mė nė fund,edhe sikur Kosova tė konstituohej si shtet i shqiptarėve,”ekzistimi i dy shteteve shqiptare nė Ballkan “do tė ishte mė parė hendikep, se sa pėrparėsi gjeopolitike e popullit shqiptar nė Ballkan”. Prandaj, Kosova i pėrmbush tė gjitha kriteret e qenies shtet i pavarur dhe sovran. Nėse bėhet fjalė pėr territorin, nė OKB janė tė anėtarėsuara 34 shtete me territor mė tė vogėl se sa Kosova.

Nėse bėhet fjalė pėr popullatėn, nė OKB janė tė anėtarėsuara 58 shtete me popullatė mė tė vogėl se sa Kosova. Nėse bėhet fjalė pėr pranimin ose jo tė shteteve tė reja nė OKB, nė periudhėn prej 1990-2002, nė OKB janė pranuar 34 shtete tė reja. Nuk thuhet kot se “aty ku janė tė pranishme faktet,fjalėt bėhen tė panevojshme”. Mbi bazėn e argumenteve dhe fakteve qė u theksuan, nė vija tė pėrgjithshme, statusi i ri politik,juridik dhe ndėrkombėtar i Kosovės duhet tė jetė ekuivalent, pa asnjė mėdyshje, me pavarėsinė dhe sovranitetin,me subjektivitet tė njohur ndėrkombėtar, nė gjithė territorin e saj, pra tė sigurojė zbatimin unik tė ligjit, pėrfshirė pjesėn veriore tė Kosovės dhe tė ashtuquajturat komuna me shumicė serbe qė nė propozimin e ambasadorit Martti Ahtisaari kanė fituar shumė kompetenca shtesė, nė emėr tė njė projekti tė decentralizimit asimetrik, territorial dhe etnik, qė pėrkundėr qėllimit me tė mirė qė mund tė jetė menduar, kėrcėnon me rrezikun qė tė jetė i dėmshėm pėr tė ardhmen e Kosovės dhe integritetin territorial te saj. Pėr Kosovėn janė tė papranueshme pėrsiatjet dhe kėrkesat serbe pėr krijimin e dy etniteteve ose pėr ndarjen e Kosovės.

Ato pėrsiatje injorojnė faktin “pėr kuantume dhe proporcione relative demografike dhe kombėtare, shprehimisht tė ndryshme”nė Kosovė. Mė nė fund, theksojmė edhe faktin tjetėr se Kosova nuk paraqet “territor diversifikativ etnik tė karakterit enklavė”. Prandaj, ”pėrthekimi i dhunshėm politik”i njė pjese tė territorit tė Kosovės”,pėrkundėr kompromiseve shumė tė dhimbshme qė ka bėrė Delegacioni i Kosovės me decentralizimin, zonat e mbrojtura pėr rreth trashėgimisė serbe dhe procedurat favorizuese legjislative pėr minoritetet, do t’i kundėrvihej drejtpėrsėdrejti entitetit burimor politik tė atij territori dhe do tė ishte nė diskordancė tė drejtpėrdrejtė me tė. Ėshtė kohė e fundit qė Kosova tė dalė nga njė “rreth i mbyllur”nė tė cilin ndodhet pėr mė shumė vjet. Kosova ėshtė nė pritje tė njė rezolute tė re tė Kėshillit tė Sigurimit tė OKB-sė tė cilėn do tė duhej ta karakterizonin: Sė pari,qartėsia politike, juridike dhe ndėrkombėtare e statusit tė Kosovės qė do tė mėnjanonte ambiguitetet nė lidhje me tė. Sė dyti,subjektiviteti i plotė ndėrkombėtar i cili Kosovės do t’i hapte mundėsinė e anėtarėsimit nė mekanizmat ndėrkombėtare, pėrfshirė aty edhe OKB-nė. Sė treti, integriteti territorial i vendit qė do tė siguronte shtrirjen e qeverisjes sė institucioneve tė Kosovės dhe zbatimin unik tė ligjit nė gjithė hapėsirėn e saj. Sė katėrti, shteti funksional i Kosovės qė do tė mund tė pengonte invalidimin e mundshėm tė tij.

Original English
The truth about Kosovo The attention of world diplomacy is focusing on Kosovo ever more. We have now in the hands of UN Security Council a proposal addressed by former Finish President Martti Ahtisari which is attached to the document that sets the framework for a possible future status of Kosovo, has summarized the guarantees for the position of minorities, and in particular the Serbian minority has described the modalities for the relatively emphasized international presence in Kosovo, with executive authority as well as authority to interpret its mandate, even after the decision for the new status, which limits Kosovo’s eventual sovereignty.

Now it is on the members of the Security Council to reach a decision on Kosovo’s future. We are aware that Serbia has undertaken a diplomatic offensive to influence the members of the Security Council of UN in order to unable the adoption of a new resolution, with the justification that Ahtisari’s proposal recommends “annexation of Serbia’s territory” and “removal of Serbia’s sovereignty over Kosovo” and that all of this, according to Belgrade officials, “is in contradiction with international law”. This is the reason why, in an effort to inform your readers and the members of the Security Council, I will highlight in broad lines a number of historic, political and legal arguments and facts that convincingly speak that Kosovo was occupied by Serbia in an unlawful manner, which is why Albanians, as a majority population in Kosovo, should enjoy the right to self-determination, whether that is as a majority population in an individualized territory or as their national right. By proving this truth, this article aims to, at the same time, prove that Serbia’s projects for the creation of two entities in Kosovo or its partition are unacceptable. Firstly, given that Kosovo was annexed by Serbia in an unlawful manner Kosovo’s independence will in no way be in contradiction with international law. On the contrary, Kosovo independence even before being qualified as a “classic case of secession from a sovereign state”, as Serbs argue, should be considered as “annulment of an unlawful annexation.

In fact it was Serbia that acted in contradiction with international law in 1912 when it annexed Kosovo through military occupation after its aggression against the Ottoman Empire, “even though Kosovo had its historic and ethnic identity, accompanied by its right to liberation, whether that was from the Ottoman occupation (1912) or Fascist occupation (1944), and in spite of its geographical demographic and cultural integrity”. Consequently, instead of admitting its unlawful act, which she committed while violating international law in a bold manner, Serbia is now using an argument which is scientifically and historically unsustainable, namely to “preserve its sovereignty over Kosovo”, which, as proved by facts, she held in an unlawful manner for a long period of time without ever asking the majority population of Kosovo or having their consent. Kosovo was occupied during Balkan wars (1912-1913)" in contradiction with the aspiration of the Albanians, expressed during their national liberation movement 1878-1912". In this manner Serbia, in spite of getting the “international legitimacy” for the occupation of Kosovo, in no way was able to justify the legitimacy of its act.

In addition to this, Serbian possessive attitudes towards Kosovo which refer to history are unfounded. Firstly "they are unfounded in its methodological qualification of the national character of a territory because if history is to be taken as a criteria, in light of contemporary national-territorial realities, Hungary has the right to the Panonic part of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Hungary would argue about their rights over Belgrade, Greece would claim a right over Istanbul, Albania over Janina, Mexico over Florida and California, Sweden over Finland and Norway, Germany over Shlezi and Sudet regions, Denmark over Shlezivik, Iraq over Kuwait etc". Secondly, Serbia’s possessive attitudes towards Kosovo are unfounded in the aspect of material truth, since Kosovo, in spite of allegations of such nature “in neither a cradle of Serbian nation, nor of Serbian state”. Finally, imperialistic ambitions with “historic rights” could not be defended by England, France, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, which, as it is known “with centuries held many nations under their occupation. Therefore “with the destruction of colonial empires over 120 new states were created”.

Serbia was “under the occupation of Ottoman Empire for over five centuries (1389-1878)". Spain “had conquered all Latin America in the beginning of XVI century". Neither do “Russians ever mention their historic rights over Ukraine”. Historic arguments speak very clearly that “Serbs were placed in Kosovo with their expansion under the rule of Nemanjics’”. As a result of occupations during the Ottoman Empire, many ethnic minorities, such as Serbs, Turks and Roma, were placed in the ethnic Albanian territories. The Serbian minority was greatly expanded with "the violent colonization that occurred between two world wars; nevertheless their percentage never exceeded 10% of the overall population". On the basis of these facts the conclusion is very clear: it was in deed the Serbian aggression, occupation and annexation of Kosovo that violated the international law and not otherwise, namely that Kosovo independence "would violate international law".

History "is a witness of denationalization policies; of gross crimes against Albanians during 1912-1918; for genocidal Serbian plans for the extermination of Albanians; for the deportation of Albanians in Turkey and for confiscation the lands of the population and its colonization with Serbs and Montenegrins". The time period between February 1998 and June 10, 1999 only exceeded "these special cases and took the gravity of a general genocide of the Serbian regime against Albanians". Secondly, the decision for Kosovo’s future cannot ignore the constitutional position of Kosovo in former Yugoslavia although Kosovo did not enjoy the status of a republic. However, most importantly, Kosovo was a constitute part of former Yugoslavia with a defined territory and borders, which could not be changed without its consent.

Kosovo was directly represented in the former Yugoslav federation same as the other republics, not through Serbia because we would create a paradox as in that case Serbia "would have three votes in the Federation, while the other units would have only one vote". With its political-territorial identities, its constitution, Kosovo was a federally constitute unit of the multinational federation of Yugoslavia. That Kosovo was not part of Serbia can be proven by the following historical and political facts:" Kosovo was not part of the independent sovereign state of Serbia with its international personality recognized in the Berlin Congress (1878); Kosovo was not part of Serbia in the Second AVNOJ Congress (1943); Kosovo was not part of Serbia during its establishment as a federal unit in the Anti-Fascist Popular Liberation Council (1944); Kosovo was not part of Serbia in the structure of Constitutional Assembly of Yugoslavia when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was founded (1945). Kosovo was not included in the sovereign Serbia, except in federal Serbia within federal Yugoslavia, during the military occupation of Kosovo (1945)".

Finally it is worth mentioning that the abolishment of Kosovo’s autonomy with the amendments in the Constitution of Serbia, an act, which occurred on March 28 1989, was done in an unlawful manner. Even if we didn’t have the essential deficiencies regarding the declaration in the Kosovo Assembly, deficiencies that are proven, “lack of free will”, as a result of extraordinary political pressures, "makes the declaration for constitutional amendments unconstitutional". Thirdly, the future of Kosovo cannot be compared with secessions in some other parts of the world. The states that remain reserved towards Kosovo independence should be mindful of this fact. They should instead look and find the “common ground” between Kosovo and certain other countries of the world, which have agreed to the removal of sovereignty over other territories. In this regard, the relations between Kosovo and Serbia are comparable with the relations of Indonesia and East Timor.

As it is well known, East Timor was occupied and annexed by Indonesia in 1975, "contrary to the will of Portugal as the external sovereign", a fact which makes the annexation of Indonesia unlawful. In 1988 Indonesian government recognized the right to self-determination to the East Timor people. Singapore is another example that should be taken under consideration. This country was partitioned from Malaysia in 1965. The example of Eritrea is also meaningful for Kosovo. It was the Ethiopian government that recognized the right to self-determination to Eritrea in 1991. The case of Kosovo is also similar to the case of Namibia. Partition of Namibia from South Africa and its independence occurred in 1991. Therefore Kosovo’s independence should not be compared with secession of territories that were "not annexed in a unilateral manner (against the will of the people of the original sovereigns), which joined existing states but that they are operating in territories that were part of these states at the time when they were established".

In this way even the separatist movements in Transdnjestrovle (Moldavia), in Southern Osetia and Abkhazia (Georgia) that do not have the ethnic basis that Kosovo has and which didn’t have an autonomous or federal status at the time of dissolution of former Soviet Union as Kosovo had at the time of dissolution of former Yugoslavia. Finally, Kosovo Albanians are not comparable with Catalonians, Scots, Wellsians, Basks or Corsicans… because they did not face a massive deportation from the states, which controlled them. Fourthly, the existence of Albania as an Albanian state cannot hinder the independence and sovereignty for Kosovo, because as we can recall from history neither did the status of Romania "hinder the independence of Moldavia nor did the existence of France hindered the establishment of the canton-state of Switzerland".

Finally, "even if Kosovo was constituted as an Albanian state in the Balkans, this would be a handicap rather than an advantage of Albanian population in the Balkans". Consequently Kosovo fulfills all the criteria for being an independent and sovereign state. If it is about the size of the territory, 34 states with smaller territory are members of the UN. If it is about the population, 58 states with a smaller number of population are members of the UN. If it is for the acceptance or not of new states in the UN, it should be noted that between 1990 and 2002, UN has accepted 34 new member states. The proverb that “wherever we have facts, words become unnecessary” is not meaningless. On the basis of these arguments and facts emphasized, in broad lines, the new political legal and international status of Kosovo should be the equivalent, without any doubt, with independence and sovereignty with internationally recognized personality in all of its territory, in the manner to ensure the consistent enforcement of law, including the northern part of Kosovo and the so-called municipalities with Serbian majority, which in the proposal of Ambassador Martti Ahtisari have gained significant competencies in the name of an asymmetric territorial and ethnic based decentralization, which in spite of its well intentions threatens the future of Kosovo.

Serbian claims for the creation of two entities or for partitioning of Kosovo are unacceptable for Kosovo. These claims "ignore the fact of expressively different demographic and national quantum and proportions". In the end we would like to emphasize the fact that Kosovo "is not an ethnically diversifiable territory of an enclave character". Therefore "the violent surrounding of one part of Kosovo’s territory", in spite of painful compromises that Kosovo delegation agreed to with decentralization, protective zones around Serbian heritage sites and favorable legislative procedures for minorities would directly contradict the derivative political entity of that territory and would not be in accordance with it. It is about time that Kosovo gets out from the “closed circle” in which it was for so many years.

Kosovo is awaiting a new resolution from the Security Council of UN, which should be characterized from: Firstly, political, legal and international clarity regarding the status of Kosovo, which would prevent ambiguity in regard to it. Secondly, full international personality which would enable Kosovo to seek membership in international mechanisms, including UN. Thirdly, territorial integrity, which would ensure the extension of Kosovo governing institutions and consistent enforcement of the law in its entire territory. Fourthly, functional state of Kosovo, which would prevent its possible invalidation.

Shkoder.net... - Fjala e Lirė | Tė drejtat e rezervuara